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I. INTRODUCTION
Can an employer make his employees foot the bill for his
religious beliefs? Merely to ask this question is to answer it. "Religious
liberty" does not and cannot include the right to impose the costs of
observing one's religion on someone else, especially in the for-profit
workplace. Until Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius,' this was a
* Guy Anderson Chair & Professor of Law, Brigham Young University.
** John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Northwestern
University. This article is partly adapted from Brief for Amici Curiae Church-State Scholars
Frederick Mark Gedicks, et al., Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (No. 13-354) & Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec. U.S. Dept. Health Hum. Servs. (No. 13 356), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2387895, which in turn is indebted to
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception
Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil
Liberties Law Review (forthcoming Apr. 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2328516
(Jan. 24, 2014). We are grateful to Marty Lederman and Brett Scharffs for comments and
criticisms of earlier drafts of this Essay.
1. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1147 (10th Cir.) (5-3 en banc
decision) (upholding exemption of for-profit employer from requirement that employer's health
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basic and unquestioned aspect of the law of freedom of religion. The
Establishment Clause forbids accommodations of religion in the for-
profit workplace that impose significant burdens on identifiable and
discrete third parties. In Hobby Lobby, a group of employers are
demanding the right to refuse health insurance coverage of
contraception needed by women who do not share the employers'
religious beliefs.
In the United States, most health insurance for the non-elderly is
provided through employers. Employer-based coverage has the economic
advantages of economies of scale and the creation of natural risk pools.
It is also encouraged by the tax code.2 Most Americans depend upon it.
The Affordable Care Act of 2010 (the "ACA") seeks to approach
the goal of universal coverage by expanding employer health
insurance with a requirement that large employers provide their
employees with such insurance or pay an assessment fee. The
requirement would, of course, accomplish little if the government said
nothing about what must be covered by the insurance. So a minimum
benefits package is specified. Among other things, the ACA mandates
that insurers cover "preventive health services" without additional
charge-that is, without co-payments, co-insurance, deductibles, or
the like.
As it happens, one element of this minimum package is
coverage for contraception. The options that are most effective at
preventing pregnancy or medically appropriate for some women can be
prohibitively expensive. Unwanted pregnancy can deprive a person of
control over the entire course of her life. It also is relevant that one of
the principal inequities of the health care system before the ACA was
that insurance often excluded coverage of medical needs specific to
women, making women bear higher health care costs than men-as
much as a billion dollars a year more in the aggregate.3
Accordingly, the Department of Health and Human Services
issued the "contraception mandate" (the "Mandate"), a rule that
defines all FDA-approved contraceptives as preventive services,
thereby requiring their coverage without charge in all healthcare
plans. The rule elicited objections from churches and other
insurance plan cover contraceptives to which employer religiously objects), cert. granted, 134 S.
Ct. 678 (Nov. 26, 2013).
2. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMER-
DRIVEN MOVEMENT 59-61 (2007).
3 Denise Grady, Overhaul Will Lower the Costs of Being a Woman, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
2010; Turning to Fairness: Insurance Discrimination Against Women Today and the Affordable
Care Act, NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, Mar. 16, 2012, available at http://
www.nwlc.org/resource/report-turning-fairness-insurance-discrimination-again st- wome n- today-
and-affordable -care -ac.
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nonprofit religious entities that conscientiously objected to
facilitating what they regard as evil conduct. The Obama
Administration devised accommodations for objecting religious
organizations, 4 but refused accommodations to for-profit businesses
whose owners religiously object to some or all of the mandated
contraception coverage. The result has been dozens of lawsuits, and the
Court has agreed to hear two, one of which is Hobby Lobby.5
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., runs a large chain of arts and crafts
stores, employing 13,000 employees in 600 locations scattered
throughout 39 states. Its owners also operate a much smaller group of
Christian bookstores, with 400 total employees. Forbes estimates its
annual revenues at more than $2 billion.6
Hobby Lobby is owned by the Green family, all of whom
observe an evangelical faith which holds that life begins at conception.
The Greens thus believe that any form of contraception that prevents
pregnancy after fertilization, which in their view includes day-after
and week-after pills and some IUDs, destroys innocent human life.
When the Mandate was announced, Hobby Lobby and the Greens
sought a preliminary injunction under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), 7 exempting them from supplying
mandated contraceptives to which they religiously object. Although
the federal district court denied the injunction, a deeply divided Tenth
Circuit granted it. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.
Hobby Lobby is now asking the Court to uphold their RFRA
exemption from the Mandate. The Mandate would otherwise require
Hobby Lobby's health plan to fully cover the contraceptives to which it
objects at no additional cost to its employees or drop its health plan
altogether. Upholding the exemption, therefore, would shift the cost of
accommodating Hobby Lobby's religious beliefs about contraception to
employees who do not share them. Such cost-shifting violates the
Establishment Clause.
4. See Robert Pear, Birth Control Rule Altered to Allay Religious Objections, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2013.
5. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1114, cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir.)
(2-1 decision), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (Nov. 26, 2013). The Court of Appeals in Conestoga
Wood held that the claimants lacked standing to bring suit under RFRA and thus did not reach
the merits of their RFRA claim.
Contraception mandate lawsuits are collected on a website maintained by the Becket Fund
for Religious Liberty, available at http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/, and now
number nearly 100.
6. See Americas Largest Private Companies: #194 Hobby Lobby Stores, FORBES, available
at http://www.forbes.com/lists/2011/2 I/private-companies- 11Hobby-Lobby-Stores ZGO2.html
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to bb-4 (2012).
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II. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE LIMITS
The Establishment Clause generally prohibits the government
from shifting the costs of accommodating a religion from those who
practice it to those who do not. "The First Amendment... gives no one
the right to insist that in pursuit of their own interest others must
conform their conduct to his own religious necessities."8
Throughout the litigation involving the Mandate, the lower
courts have failed to examine the Establishment Clause implications
of the RFRA exemption sought by Hobby Lobby and other for-profit
businesses. The prohibition against cost-shifting religious
accommodations does not affect the facial validity of RFRA because
most accommodations do not impose significant costs on others. But
the Establishment Clause does prohibit RFRA's application when-as
with the exemption sought by Hobby Lobby-a particular exemption
would shift the costs of the accommodated religious practice to
identifiable and discrete third parties in the for-profit workplace. This
prohibition controls the outcome of this case regardless of how the
Court might rule on the prima facie elements of Hobby Lobby's RFRA
claim. 9
In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,10 the Court held that a
statute requiring employers to accommodate employees' Sabbath
observance violated the Establishment Clause because of the
"substantial economic burdens" it imposed on employers and the
"significant burdens" it imposed on other employees.11 The Court has
similarly rejected religious accommodations that impose costs on a
class of discrete and identifiable third parties when interpreting the
Free Exercise Clause and Title VII.12 It has upheld a permissive, cost-
shifting accommodation of religion in only a single decision, allowing
8. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (citation omitted).
9. Thus, if a RFRA exemption from the Mandate violates the Establishment Clause, such
an exemption cannot be granted regardless of whether this Court ultimately finds that Hobby
Lobby is a "person" exercising religion and that the Mandate substantially burdens Hobby
Lobby's religious beliefs. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l(a), (b) (2012).
10. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985), reaffirmed and applied in
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720, 722 (2005).
11. Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 710.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (refusing to grant employer an
exemption from payroll taxes under Free Exercise Clause because of, inter alia, the burden the
exemption would have imposed on its employees); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (interpreting Title VII to require employer accommodation of employee
religious practices only when costs to employers and other employees are de minimis).
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the nonprofit arm of a church to require its employees to adhere to its
religious standards.13
The Mandate requires that Hobby Lobby provide insurance
coverage of contraceptive drugs and services to employees and their
dependents free of all co-payments, co-insurance, and other out-of-
pocket payments beyond the employees' contribution to their health
plan premiums. This coverage is a legally mandated and economically
valuable employee entitlement, just like benefits provided by the
Social Security Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Family and
Medical Leave Act, and other federal statutes that mandate specific
employee compensation and benefits. If the Court were to uphold
Hobby Lobby's claim for a RFRA exemption from the Mandate, it
would deprive Hobby Lobby's thousands of female employees and its
employees' covered female dependents of this entitlement. This would
saddle many employees with significant burdens ranging from the
substantial out-of-pocket expense of purchasing certain contraceptives
to the personal and financial costs of unintended pregnancies.
These burdens would not be imposed only on Hobby Lobby
employees, or only with respect to the contraceptives to which it
religiously objects. If Hobby Lobby were granted the RFRA exemption
it seeks, there would be no principled way to distinguish
accommodation of its objections to a few forms of contraception 14 from
accommodations sought by an employer who religiously opposes all
forms of contraception.1 5 Every for-profit employer and business owner
in the United States will be empowered to reject insurance coverage
for contraception or any other medical prescription, procedure,
treatment, or health service it finds religiously objectionable. Indeed,
employers will be free to claim religious exemptions from any federal
employment law to which they object, thereby forcing the government
to prove that every such law satisfies strict scrutiny.' 6
The Establishment Clause requires that RFRA be interpreted
not to authorize the sort of cost-shifting religious accommodation that
Hobby Lobby seeks. Thus, even if Hobby Lobby may assert a corporate
RFRA claim, and even if it can establish that the Mandate
substantially burdens its religious exercise, it cannot prevail because
13. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336-40 (1987).
14. Hobby Lobby is seeking an exemption for four contraceptives, Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at
1125, while Conestoga Wood is seeking exemption for two, Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 382.
15. See, e.g., Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1299 1300 (D. Colo. 2012)
(granting for-profit corporation and its owners a preliminary injunction under RFRA, applicable
to all FDA-approved contraceptive methods).
16. See, e.g., Gilardi v. U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1240 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (Edwards, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
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the Constitution prevents an application of RFRA that would impose
significant costs on others. Indeed, RFRA itself provides that the
statutory right authorizes only "appropriate" judicial relief and gives
way to a "compelling state interest";17 violating the Constitution is
never appropriate, and conforming to its requirements is always
compelling.
III. UNCONSTITUTIONAL BURDEN-SHIFTING
Many permissive religious accommodations entail no burden on
third parties. In Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal,18 for example, a 130-member sect that used a controlled
substance in its sacraments was excused from compliance with federal
drug laws. The Court noted that the government did not identify any
burdens imposed on persons not belonging to the sect, 19 and that the
sect's small size prevented the government from showing that a RFRA
exemption would compromise its administrative or drug enforcement
interests. 20
Other permissive religious accommodations create third-party
burdens that are insignificant because they are widely distributed
among a large and indeterminate class. The prototypical example is a
property tax exemption for churches, along with all other nonprofit
entities, which the Court has held does not require taxpayers to make
an unwilling "contribution to religious bodies" in violation of the
Establishment Clause because it is not a religion-specific
accommodation. 2 1 There, the incremental increase in the pre-existing
tax burden was spread among all owners of taxable property and did
not fall on a limited, narrow, and discrete class.
Still other exemptions impose insignificant burdens because
they only marginally increase an already-existing significant burden.
The cases excusing religious objectors from compulsory military
service pursuant to federal law show why this kind of exemption
crosses no constitutional line. The exemption for religious pacifists
upheld in Welsh v. United States22 and United States v. Seeger23
resulted in a mathematical increase in the probability that nonexempt
persons would be drafted in their place. But all potential draftees were
already subject to a substantial risk of being drafted; the increase in
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (2012).
18. 546 U.S. 418, 435-37 (2006).
19. See id. at 435-36.
20. See id. at 437.
21. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970).
22. 398 U.S. 333, 343 44 (1970).
23. 380 U.S. 163, 187-88 (1965).
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this risk from religious pacifists was both small and distributed
among millions of nonexempt potential draftees. Like the incremental
tax increase in Walz, the religious pacifist exemption barely increased
an already-existing burden that was substantial in its own right and
thus did not impose significant additional costs on others in violation
of the Establishment Clause. Although whoever was drafted in place
of the objectors faced the consequence of going to war, the pre-existing
probability of those persons' being drafted was not significantly
increased by the exemption. 24
By contrast, affording Hobby Lobby an exemption to the
Mandate would create significant burdens and impose them on an
identifiable group of persons. Thousands of female Hobby Lobby
employees and covered female dependents who do not share Hobby
Lobby's anti-contraception beliefs would be required to pay for or forgo
contraceptives that Hobby Lobby's health plan would otherwise cover.
Moreover, whereas the tax- and draft-exemption cases involved an
infinitesimal, marginal increase in an already-existing burden, the
religious accommodation sought by Hobby Lobby would impose on
employees significant costs that would not exist without the
exemption.
IV. THE COST TO EMPLOYEES
The Mandate is a valuable legal entitlement for Hobby Lobby's
employees. It requires that employer health plans cover FDA-
approved contraception and related services without "patient cost-
sharing"-that is, without co-payments, co-insurance, deductibles, or
other out of pocket expense beyond the employee's share of the basic
health-insurance premium.25
Congress enacted the Mandate in part in response to studies
showing that "[i]ndividuals are more likely to use preventive services
if they do not have to satisfy cost-sharing requirements" and that
"[u]se of preventive services results in a healthier population and
reduces health care costs by helping individuals avoid preventable
conditions and receive treatment earlier."2 6 In particular, Congress
recognized that "women have unique health care needs... [that]
include contraceptive services" and sought to "ensure that
24. Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. (forthcoming April 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2328516 (Jan. 24, 2014), at
25-26, 29-30 & n.105.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012).
26. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg.
39,870, 39,872 (July 2, 2013).
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recommended preventive services for women would be covered
adequately ... "27
Women of childbearing age spend sixty-eight percent more in
out-of-pocket health care costs than men largely because of the costs of
reproductive and gender-specific conditions, including the costs of
contraception. 28 Some contraceptive methods are not medically
suitable for women with particular medical conditions or risk factors,
and certain more expensive methods are more effective at preventing
pregnancy than less costly alternatives. 29
Women take account of costs when deciding whether to use
contraceptives. 3 0 If Hobby Lobby is granted an exemption, thousands
of women will incur significant out-of-pocket costs or forgo altogether
the contraceptives Hobby Lobby refuses to cover if they cannot afford
to pay for them. 31 For women who need a particular contraception
option at a particular time, this loss of coverage is a discrete, focused,
and significant harm, especially in emergencies entailing the risk of
pregnancy from coerced sex.
In addition, there are numerous health-related and economic
repercussions associated with the failure to make available the full
range of contraception. For example, pregnancy may be dangerous for
women with serious medical conditions, such as pulmonary
hypertension, cyanotic heart disease, and Marfan Syndrome. 32 The
lives of women suffering from these conditions literally depends on
their access to the contraception most effective for them. Similarly,
"there are demonstrated preventive health benefits from
contraceptives relating to conditions other than pregnancy[,]" which
27. Id.; see also INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE
GAPS 16-18 (2011) ('IOM Rep.") (noting that women's health needs differ from those of men, and
these differences have a serious impact on the cost of healthcare coverage).
28. IOM Rep., supra note 27, at 19-20; see also Rachel Benson Gold, The Need for and Cost
of Mandating Private Insurance Coverage of Contraception, in GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL'Y,
Aug. 1998, at 5; James Trussell et al., Erratum to "Cost Effectiveness of Contraceptives in the
United States," 80 CONTRACEPTION 229, 229 (2009); Cost Comparison Chart, PARAGARD,
http://www.paragard.com/ how-do-i-get-it/Payment.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (product cost
of $754).
29. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,872; IOM Rep. at 105; e.g. If Mirena Isn't Covered, MIRENA,
http://www.mirena-us.com/how-to-get-mirena/if-mirena-isnt-covered.php (last visited Jan. 24,
2014) (noting that an IUD, the most reliable and cost-effective form of contraception, costs
$927.18).
30. See Melissa S. Kearney & Phillip B. Levine, Subsidized Contraception, Fertility, and
Sexual Behavior, 91 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 137 (2009) (decreasing the cost of contraceptives
leads to a higher usage rate which, in turn, decreases the rate of unintended pregnancies).
31. A 2007 study found that 52 percent of women (compared with only 39 percent of men)
failed to fill a prescription, missed a recommended test or treatment, or did not schedule a
necessary specialist appointment because of cost. Sheila D. Rustgi et al., Women at Risk: Why
Many W47omen Are Forgoing Needed Health Care, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, May 2009, at 3.
32. IOM Rep., supra note 27, at 103-04; see also 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,872.
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include the prevention of certain cancers, menstrual disorders, and
acne.33 Again, proper treatment of women suffering from these
conditions depends upon their access to particular forms of
contraception.
The use of contraceptives also reduces the risk of unintended
pregnancies, which comprise nearly half of all pregnancies in the
United States. 34 Women with unintended pregnancies are less likely
to receive timely prenatal care and are more likely to smoke, consume
alcohol, become depressed, experience domestic violence during
pregnancy, and terminate their pregnancies by abortion. 35 Finally,
unintended pregnancies prevent women from participating in labor
and employment markets on an equal basis with men.36
The Tenth Circuit's exemption of Hobby Lobby from the
Mandate under RFRA thus constitutes the exercise of congressional
power and federal judicial power to force Hobby Lobby employees to
use their after-tax wages to purchase contraception and to shoulder
other burdens that they would otherwise not have to bear.
V. BEGGING THE BASELINE QUESTION
Common sense tells us that a RFRA exemption of Hobby Lobby
from the Mandate deprives employees of a valuable legal entitlement.
Some Mandate opponents have nevertheless suggested that because
the Mandate is new and controversial, it is not a legal entitlement,
and thus its loss by employees does not constitute a burden shifted to
them in violation of the Establishment Clause. 37 But there is no
,'vesting period" before a mandated federal benefit becomes a legal
entitlement. As Justice Scalia has observed, once the government
"makes a public benefit generally available, that benefit becomes part
of the baseline against which burdens on religion are measured." 38 For
example, the Court has squarely rejected religious accommodations of
33. 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,872; IOM Rep., supra note 27, at 107.
34. IOM Rep., supra note 27, at 102-03.
35. Id.; see also 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,872.
36. See Jennifer J. Frost & Laura Duberstein Lindberg, Reasons for Using Contraception:
Perspectives of US Women Seeking Care at Specialized Family Planning Clinics, 87
CONTRACEPTION 465, 465 (2012) ("Economic analyses have found clear associations between the
availability and diffusion of oral contraceptives particularly among young women, and increases
in U.S. women's education, labor force participation, and average earnings, coupled with a
narrowing in the wage gap between women and men.").
37. Marc DeGirolami, On the Claim that Exemptions from, the Mandate Violate the
Establishment Clause, MIRROR OF JUSTICE: A BLOG DEDICATED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CATHOLIC LEGAL THEORY (Dec. 5, 2013),
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2013/12/exemptions-from-the-mandate-do-not
violate-the-establishment-clause.html.
38. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 726 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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employers that would deprive their employees of social security
benefits or the minimum wage. Depriving employees of the generally
available benefits of full contraceptive coverage under the Mandate is
conceptually identical to depriving them of any other generally
available employee benefit mandated by federal law and thus
constitutes a burden imposed on them to accommodate their
employer's religious beliefs.
Other mandate opponents have made a more subtle argument
that RFRA constitutes a pre-existing external limit on the ACA and
the Mandate (and on the Social Security Act, the Fair Labor
Standards Act, and every other federal employment statute and
regulation). Accordingly, the argument goes, no employee possesses a
legal entitlement to contraception coverage under the Mandate,
because such coverage violates RFRA; loss of such coverage via a
RFRA exemption is thus not a legally cognizable burden because
employees had no legal right to coverage in the first place.3 9
This argument begs the very question at issue: Whether the
Establishment Clause precludes the application of RFRA to exempt
employers from the Mandate when doing so would impose significant
costs on employees and other third parties who do not share the
employer's religious beliefs. Even assuming that RFRA externally
limits the Mandate, the Establishment Clause limits RFRA, both
externally and internally. If the Clause precludes RFRA exemptions
when they impose significant costs on third parties, then the Clause
denies Congress and the federal courts the authority to grant such
exemptions (external limit).40 And under the terms of RFRA itself the
federal government has a compelling interest that justifies denial of
such exemptions-keeping its activities within the bounds set by the
Establishment Clause (internal limit).41
Josh Blackman offers this argument in its most radical form.
He claims that if the state specifically licenses religious people to
violate the rights of nonadherents, there is no state action and so no
39. See, e.g., Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Hobby
Lobby & Conestoga, et al., Hobby Lobby (No. 13-354) & Conestoga Wood (No. 13-356), at 3-4, 18-
19; Brief of Nat'l Ass'n of Evangelicals as Amicus Curiae Supporting Hobby Lobby & Contestoga,
et al., Hobby Lobby (No. 13-354) & Conestoga Wood (No. 13-356), at 2-3, 5-8.
40. Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 24, at 34-35, 37-38.
41. Brief of Amici Curiae Church-State Scholars Frederick Mark Gedicks, et al., in Support
of the Government, Hobby Lobby (No. 13-354) & Conestoga Wood (No. 13-356), at 7, 27 28.
Simply avoiding the possibility of violating the Establishment Clause may also constitute a
compelling government interest. Cf. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (upholding under Free
Exercise Clause state's denial of scholarship to ministerial student motivated by state's desire to
avoid violating state anti-establishment clause).
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violation of the Establishment Clause.42 If this were correct, then it
would be permissible for the state to exempt Aztecs from homicide
laws.
In short, Mandate opponents cannot prevail on the basis of
arguments about federal entitlement "baselines." They must directly
engage Caldor, Cutter, and the many other Supreme Court decisions
that prohibit permissive accommodation of religion at the expense of
third parties who derive no benefit from the accommodation. A RFRA
exemption from the Mandate for Hobby Lobby would deprive its
employees of a federal entitlement solely to facilitate the exercise of
Hobby Lobby's religion. This violates the Establishment Clause.
VI. THE IRRELEVANCE OF AMOS
Mandate opponents routinely cite Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop v. Amos as authority for the proposition that the
Establishment Clause does not prohibit permissive accommodations
that burden third parties. 43 In Amos, the Mormon Church terminated
the custodial supervisor of its nonprofit gymnasium for failing to
observe the highest standards of Mormonism. The church acted under
a provision of Title VII that exempts "all activities of religious
organizations" from Title VII's religious anti-discrimination
provisions. Although this exemption clearly imposes significant costs
on employees of exempted religious organizations, the Court upheld it
against an Establishment Clause challenge.
Those who rely on Amos to justify cost-shifting accommodation
of for-profit businesses ignore both its narrow holding and its wholly
unpersuasive attempt to distinguish Caldor. As Professors Schragger,
Schwartzman, and Tebbe have demonstrated, the Court carefully
circumscribed its holding in Amos, expressly limiting its validation of
the Title VII exemption to the nonprofit activities of churches and
other religious organizations.44 Hobby Lobby fails on both counts: It is
neither a church nor a "religious organization," and its activities are
for-profit, not nonprofit.
Mandate opponents also rely on Amos to distinguish Caldor
and maintain that a RFRA exemption for Hobby Lobby would entail
no government action to which the Establishment Clause could
42. See Josh Blackman, Hobby Lobby, RFRA, and a "Private Establishment Clause" JOSH
BLACKMAN'S BLOG (Jan. 21, 2014), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2014/01/21/hobby-lobby-rfra-
and-a-private-establishment-clause/.
43. 483 U.S. 327, 335-38 (1985).
44. Richard Schragger, Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Hobby Lobby and the
Establishment Clause, Part III: Reconciling Amos and Cutter, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 9, 2013),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-and-establishment-clause 9.html.
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apply.45 The Amos majority insisted that the exemption merely left
religious organizations free to shift the costs of the exemption to third
parties but did not require them to do so. Any such costs were thus the
result of private action which the Establishment Clause does not and
cannot restrict.
This reasoning is obscure, to say the least. The point of the
Title VII exemption was precisely to excuse religious organizations
from the legal duty of religious nondiscrimination which employers
owe to employees under Title VII. When exempted religious
organizations religiously discriminate against employees after having
been freed by the government to do so, it makes utterly no sense to
conclude that the government had no hand in depriving those
employees of their rights against religious discrimination. 46 This is no
doubt why the Amos majority's "distinction" of Caldor appears
nowhere in Cutter v. Wilkinson, which instead reconciled its holding
with Caldor by expressly holding that cost-shifting exemptions under
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act are subject
to as-applied challenges under the Establishment Clause. 47
RFRA itself is federal government action, as would be the order
of a federal court exempting Hobby Lobby from the Mandate under
RFRA's authority. The significant burdens shifted to Hobby Lobby
employees as the result of a RFRA exemption, therefore, would be the
result of federal government action which the Establishment Clause
prohibits.
Indeed, a RFRA exemption from the Mandate would function
precisely as a government license which allows Hobby Lobby to harm
the legitimate interests of its employees for its own religious
purposes. 48 One can hardly imagine a contemporary practice that is
closer to the concerns that motivated the addition of the
Establishment Clause to the Constitution.49
45. See, e.g., Brief of Nat'l Ass'n of Evangelicals, supra note 39, at 15 18; DeGirolami,
supra note 37.
46. Amos, 483 U.S. at 347 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that the
religious organization had the power to force the plaintiff to observe its religious tenets or be
fired "because the Government had lifted from the religious organization the general regulatory
burden imposed by" Title VII).
47. See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 24, at 30-34; Schragger, Schwartzman & Tebbe,
supra note 44.
48. Cf. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 124-27 (1982) (allowing church to veto
liquor license application by business in the vicinity delegated government authority to religion
in violation of Establishment Clause).
49. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, The Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom,
enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia, Jan. 19, 1786 ('[N]o man shall be compelled to
frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced,
restrained, molested, or burdened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of
his religious opinions or belief."), quoted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 28 (1947)
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VII. THE IRRELEVANCE OF OTHER EXEMPTIONS FROM THE MANDATE
Referring to the exemptions from the Mandate found in the
ACA and its implementing regulations, the Tenth Circuit determined
that "the interest here cannot be compelling because the
contraceptive-coverage requirement presently does not apply to tens of
millions of people."50
That the Mandate allows other permissive exemptions,
however, has no bearing on whether a cost-shifting religious
exemption violates the Establishment Clause. The existence of other
exemptions cannot cure or justify an exemption that violates the
Establishment Clause, because the government's compliance with the
Clause cannot be waived or balanced away. The ACA exemptions are
facially permissible precisely because they do not violate the
Establishment Clause or any other constitutional provision.
The Mandate provides two primary religious
accommodations. 51 First, it fully exempts "churches, their integrated
auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches," as well as
(Rutledge, J., dissenting); Thomas Jefferson, Draft of Bill Exempting Dissenters from
Contributing to the Support of the Church (Nov. 30, 1776) ("[A]ll Dissenters of whatever
Denomination from the said Church [of England] shall . . . be totally free and exempt from all
Levies Taxes and impositions whatever towards supporting and maintaining the said Church as
it now is or may hereafter be established and its Ministers."), in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION
74, 74 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987); James Madison, Memorial and
Remonstrance against Religious Assessments 4 (asserting that proposed Virginia religious tax
'violate[d] equality by subjecting some to peculiar burdens" and "granting to others peculiar
exemptions"), quoted in Ererson, 330 U.S. at 66 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see also See Cutter,
544 U.S. at 729 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[E]stablishment at the founding involved, for example,
mandatory observance or mandatory payment of taxes supporting ministers.").
50. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1143; accord Conestoga Wood Specialties, 724 F.3d at 413
(Jordan, J., dissenting) ('The government's arguments against accommodating the Hahns and
Conestoga are 'undermined by the existence of numerous exemptions [it has already made] to the
... mandate.'" (quoting Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1297)).
51. The Mandate includes other exemptions and accommodations, but these are religiously
neutral and thus do not implicate the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A)
(2012) (employers with fewer than 50 employees are not required to provide employee health
insurance; however, if they choose to do so, they must adhere to the Mandate, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012)); 45 C.F.R. § 147.140 (2013) (plans that do not significantly alter their
coverage after March 23, 2010, are exempt from the Mandate and most other requirements of the
ACA). These do not diminish the compelling character of the state's interest for two reasons: they
are, for the most part, temporary and transitional, and even if they were not, comparative
analysis of accommodations is not necessary to show that there is a compelling interest in
promoting women's health, bodily integrity, liberty, and equality. See Andrew Koppelman,
"Freedom of the Church" and the Authority of the State, 21 J. CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES 145,
157 64 (2013).
The statute also creates a minor exemption for individuals who voluntarily join a "health
care sharing ministry" through which members share medical expenses that conform to their
religious beliefs. Because participation in such a ministry is voluntary, it entails no third-party
burdens.
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"the exclusively religious activities of any religious order," so long as
these are operated as nonprofit entities under the Internal Revenue
Code.52 And second, it provides an accommodation to religious
organizations that oppose the coverage of mandated contraceptives on
religious grounds, are organized and operated as nonprofit entities,
hold themselves out as religious organizations, and self-certify to
these three criteria.53 In this second case, contraceptive coverage is
provided instead by the religious nonprofit's health plan insurer or
administrator.5 4 Because payment for contraception within a health
care plan is at least cost neutral, the third-party insurer is not likely
to incur additional net costs from supplying contraceptives for free. 55
To the extent insurers do, in fact, incur net costs for providing
mandated contraceptive coverage, the ACA and regulations
thereunder permit these costs to be allocated as an administrative
expense to all insured healthcare plans (other than those plans
entitled to the religious accommodation) or reimbursed by a credit
against the insurer's payment of the health insurance exchange tax. 56
Neither the church exemption nor the religious nonprofit
accommodation violates the Establishment Clause by shifting
accommodation costs to third parties. Under Amos, a church is
entitled to discriminate in favor of employees who observe its
teachings against contraception. As the government has observed,
therefore, it is likely that employees of churches that religiously object
to contraception will share that objection and thus will not suffer a
significant burden if the church's health plan does not cover
contraception. As for the religious nonprofit accommodation,
employees of the accommodated religious employers continue to
52. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2013) (citing I.R.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii) (2012)).
53. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A(a) (2013).
54. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2590.715-2713A(b)(2),(3), 2590.715-2713A(c)(2)(ii) (2013); 45 C.F.R.
§§ 147.131(b), 156.50(d) (2013).
55. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,872-73, 39,877. Studies have concluded that coverage for
contraception reduces net reimbursable costs by virtue of savings in prenatal care, childbirth,
and medical treatment of newborns. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance
for Contraception, 73 WASH. L. REV. 363, 366-67 & n.13, 394-95 (1998); Adam Sonfield, The Case
for Insurance Coverage of Contraceptive Services and Supplies Without Cost -Sharing, 14
GUTTMACHER POL. REV. 7, 10 (2010); James Trussel et al., Cost Effectiveness of Contraceptives in
the United States, 79 CONTRACEPTION 5, 5 (2009) ('Contraceptive use saves nearly $19 billion in
direct medical costs each year"); C. Keanin Loomis, Note, A Battle over Birth "Control" Legal
and Legislative Employer Prescription Contraception Benefit Mandates, 11 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 463, 477-78 (2002). These savings in reimbursable costs are likely to be equal to or
greater than the cost of mandated contraceptive coverage. Accordingly, premiums charged by a
third-party insurer could, in fact, be lower when no-cost contraception coverage is included. See
Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8727-28 (Feb. 15,
2012).
56. 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,877-78.
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receive all contraceptives covered by the Mandate without cost-
sharing; they simply receive them from their employer's health
insurer or plan administrator rather than the religious nonprofit
employer.
Accordingly, the permissive religious accommodations afforded
under the ACA pose no conflict with the Establishment Clause,
because neither imposes the costs of observing the exempted
employer's anti-contraception beliefs on employees who do not share
them. The accommodation demanded by Hobby Lobby, by contrast,
would create this precise conflict.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The most depressing aspect of discussions surrounding the
Hobby Lobby litigation is the total failure to acknowledge the women
who would be harmed by RFRA exemptions from the Mandate. Only
recently have third parties attempted to intervene against RFRA
plaintiffs in an action challenging the Mandate, though even these are
students at a non-profit religious university rather than employees of
a for-profit employer. 7 Of course, one can easily imagine why
employees lacking contractual or collective-bargaining protection are
reluctant to intervene against challenges to the Mandate by their own
employer.
Instead, courts have imagined that they are balancing religious
liberty against some generalized state interest in "the promotion of
public health."5 8 One court was clueless enough to conceptualize the
problem as one of determining the harm to the government if the
exemption is granted. 9 And we are talking about a lot of women. As
we noted, Hobby Lobby alone has more than 13,000 full time
employees.6 0
Paul Brest has observed that one way in which the state can
violate the Equal Protection Clause is by "the unconscious failure to
extend to a minority the same recognition of humanity, and hence the
same sympathy and care, given as a matter of course to one's own
57. See Manya Brachear Pashman, 3 Notre Dame students weigh in on school's lawsuit
against health care law, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8, 2014, available at
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-01-08/news/chi-3-notre-dame-students-weigh-in-on-
schools-lawsuit-against-health-care-law-20140108 1 contraception-mandate-religious-
employers -health-care -law.
58. Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1297 (D. Colo. 2012).
59. Monaghan v. Sebelius, 931 F. Supp. 2d 794, 809 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
60. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp.2d 1278, 1284 (W.D. Okla. 2012),
rev'd, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 2013 WL 5297798 (2013).
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group."6 1 That kind of selective sympathy and indifference has been
pervasive in this litigation.
Under the religious accommodation provisions of Title VII,
employers are obligated to accommodate the religious practices of
their employees only if the cost of doing so is "de minimis" or
insignificant. 62 If the Court grants a RFRA exemption to Hobby Lobby,
however, it will create a religious accommodation regime in which the
religious practices of for-profit employers are entitled to
accommodation despite imposing significant costs on their female
employees and covered female dependents, while those same
employers are free from accommodating the religious practices of
those same employees when doing so entails significant costs. 63
If indeed "It]here can be no doubt that our Nation has had a
long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination," 64  this
discrimination has consisted primarily in the systematic use of
motherhood to define and limit women's social, economic, and political
capacities. When a private actor deprives women of control over their
fertility, and the courts do not even notice the dramatic asymmetry
that this deprivation would create in religious accommodation law,
then they replicate the very discrimination that they are charged with
eliminating.
It is unlikely that the victims of Hobby Lobby's religious liberty
claim would be so invisible were they owners of capital rather than
female employees. Once these women are made visible, it becomes
clear that what Hobby Lobby wants is not religious liberty for all, but
only for itself, even when the cost is religious oppression of others.
61. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 8 (1976).
62. TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
63. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Symposium: Religious questions and saving
constructions, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/symposium-
religious-questions-and-saving-constructions/.
64. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion).
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